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Abstract
Neocortical pyramidal cells can integrate two classes of input separately and use one to modulate response to the other.
Their tuft dendrites are electrotonically separated from basal dendrites and soma by the apical dendrite, and apical
hyperpolarization-activated currents (Ih) further isolate subthreshold integration of tuft inputs. When apical depolarization
exceeds a threshold, however, it can enhance response to the basal inputs that specify the cell’s selective sensitivity. This
process is referred to as apical amplification (AA). We review evidence suggesting that, by regulating Ih in the apical com-
partments, adrenergic arousal controls the coupling between apical and somatic integration zones thus modifying cognitive
capabilities closely associated with consciousness. Evidence relating AA to schizophrenia, sleep, and anesthesia is re-
viewed, and we assess theories that emphasize the relevance of AA to consciousness. Implications for theories of neocorti-
cal computation that emphasize context-sensitive modulation are summarized. We conclude that the findings concerning
AA and its regulation by arousal offer a new perspective on states of consciousness, the function and evolution of neocor-
tex, and psychopathology. Many issues worthy of closer examination arise.
Key words: apical amplification; arousal; conscious state; context-sensitive modulation; hyperpolarization-activated
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Introduction
Recent evidence indicates that inputs to the apical synapses of
mature neocortical pyramidal cells can modulate their response to
basal inputs (Larkum, 2013), and it has been hypothesized that this
is closely related to consciousness (Bachmann and Hudetz, 2014:
Bachmann, 2015; and Meyer, 2015). Here, we first review the physi-
ological evidence for modulatory effects of apical input, making
clear what neurocomputational primitives we infer from it. Then,
as adrenergic arousal is involved in regulating conscious state, we
provide an in-depth review of its effects on apical function. We
conclude that apical function, arousal, and conscious state are
indeed closely related, but do not identify apical function with con-
sciousness in general. As do many others (Koch, 2004), we take a
pragmatic empirical approach to conceptions of consciousness, as-
suming that states in which we are awake or dreaming differ fun-
damentally from those in dreamless sleep or when under general
anesthesia. We also assume that dream states differ in several
ways from waking states, including greatly reduced levels of adre-
nergic activity, coherence, and cognitive control. They do have
content, however, and the distinction between the level or state of
consciousness and its contents is crucial. Bachmann and Hudetz
(2014) argue that, in neocortex, apical inputs to pyramidal cells
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regulate the level of consciousness, whereas basal inputs specify
the contents of consciousness. Our focus is on state rather than
contents. One well-known way to quantify level and content is of-
fered by information integration theory (Oizumi et al., 2014). After
reviewing the evidence on apical function, we argue that it supports
a similar theory (Kay et al., 1998; Kay and Phillips, 2011) that has re-
cently been strengthened using advances in the formal analysis of
Shannon information (Wibral et al., 2015). Thus, the central con-
cerns of this review are with the effects of apical input on con-
scious state when awake, their regulation by both tonic and phasic
changes in adrenergic arousal, and their relevance to anesthesia,
to altered states of consciousness in dreams and psychosis, and to
theories of neocortical function.
Given these concerns, we review three large bodies of re-
search between which there has so far been little interaction
even though all three are concerned with context-sensitive pro-
cesses that are widespread throughout the neocortex. The first
shows that, in addition to the somatic integration zone that gen-
erates action potentials (APs), some common classes of mature
pyramidal cell have a functionally distinct zone near the top of
the apical dendrite that integrates input to the apical tuft
(Larkum, 2013). When this apical depolarization exceeds a thresh-
old, it amplifies the cell’s response to the basal inputs that specify
its selective sensitivity. This process is referred to as apical ampli-
fication (AA) (Larkum and Phillips, 2015; Muckli et al., 2015;
Phillips et al., 2015). It selectively enhances those signals that are
currently relevant in the context of activity elsewhere. Thus this
may provide an intracellular mechanism for effects of context
that are central to Gestalt organization, contextual disambigua-
tion, priming, attention, cognitive control, and learning (Phillips,
2015). Much of the evidence for AA comes from in vitro studies.
Some things are likely to be the same in vivo as in vitro, such as
the morphological differences between apical and basal dendritic
trees that are central to AA, but other things are likely to differ,
such as the adrenergic regulation of communication between
apical and basal zones. Hypotheses based on in vitro evidence
therefore require testing in vivo, and we cite several such tests.
The second body of research is that concerned with the ef-
fects of both tonic and phasic arousal on context-sensitive mod-
ulation. This evidence clearly indicates that arousal enhances
context-sensitivity such that high-priority signals are perceived
and remembered even better while signals of lower priority are
suppressed even more (Aston-Jones, 1985; Mather et al., 2015).
The adrenergic system plays a central role in this via arousal-
induced norepinephrine (NE) release from afferents of the locus
coeruleus (LC), which is the pontine nucleus of the noradrener-
gic arousal system that innervates all of neocortex. An influen-
tial theory of the interactions between adrenergic arousal and
selectivity (Aston-Jones, 1985; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2004) has
successfully generated much further research on these issues
(e.g. Eldar et al., 2013). Studies of the effects of arousal on per-
ception and learning have forged strong links between research
on basic cognitive processes and research on emotional arousal
(Mather et al., 2015). Though this research on arousal and that
on AA have not yet been explicitly related, it has been suggested
that one crucial function of arousal may be to enhance AA
(Larkum and Phillips, 2015; Mather et al., 2015).
The third body of research is that concerned with the func-
tions and mechanisms of consciousness. Our primary concerns
within this large, diverse, and rapidly growing area are on the
effects of arousal and on theories that explicitly relate con-
sciousness to AA (Bachmann and Hudetz, 2014; Meyer, 2015).
Sustained levels of adrenergic arousal have long been known to
be related to states of consciousness as they are at a minimum
during REM sleep, low during non-REM sleep, and much higher
during wakefulness (Foote et al., 1983; Rajkowski et al., 2004).
When awake, temporary phasic adrenergic bursts increase the
focus of conscious processing on selected activities in a way
that enhances perceptual awareness of and memory for those
activities (Mather et al., 2015). Thus, evidence that AA depends
upon noradrenergic arousal suggests that it may be involved in
the regulation of conscious state. Furthermore, much of the in-
put to apical synapses comes from the feedback, “top-down,” or
recurrent connections that have long been considered to play a
major role in conscious states (e.g. Cauller and Kulics, 1991;
Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Koch et al., 2016). Relations be-
tween AA and conscious state therefore merit close
examination.
Assessment of relations between arousal, AA, and conscious
state requires us to consider two recent discoveries in neurosci-
ence that will be unfamiliar to many readers. The first is that of
AA itself. The second is the discovery that the communication
between apical and somatic zones on which AA depends is reg-
ulated by arousal via nonsynaptic hyperpolarization-activated
HCN-channels. For an in-depth review of HCN-channels see Biel
et al. (2009). From these recent discoveries we infer that, in addi-
tion to the well-established primitives of excitation, inhibition,
and disinhibition, three new primitives have evolved within
neocortex thus extending its cognitive capabilities in funda-
mental ways. We review these recent advances in depth be-
cause they offer new perspectives on relations between mind,
brain, and consciousness.
The HCN-channels that pass hyperpolarization-activated
currents (Ih) have a high density in the apical tuft dendrites of
L5 neocortical pyramidal neurons (e.g. Lo¨rincz et al., 2002). They
are nonsynaptic cation conductances that are tonically active at
rest and therefore act as a leak conductance. This has the con-
sequence that the distal apical tuft compartment of adult neo-
cortical pyramidal neurons is electrotonically isolated from the
basal compartment and has the same input resistance as the
much larger cell body (Zhu, 2000). Combined with active proper-
ties that can produce local dendritic spikes, this results in the
key feature of large pyramidal neurons: their ability to process
functionally different streams of input separately. Given this ar-
rangement and its dependence on Ih-channels, it becomes clear
that regulation of those channels will have important conse-
quences for the computational capabilities of pyramidal neu-
rons (e.g. Berger et al., 2001; Harnett et al., 2015). This suggests a
clear link between arousal and AA because Ih-currents regulate
AA (e.g. Berger et al., 2003), and adrenergic arousal regulates Ih
and thus the interaction between somatic and apical integra-
tion zones (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Carr et al., 2007; Robbins and
Arnsten, 2009). Put simply the evidence to be reviewed suggests
that arousal enhances AA and regulates conscious state by con-
trolling flow through Ih-channels.
The following sections are organized as follows. We first
summarize evidence that supra-threshold depolarization at the
apical integration-zone amplifies response to basal input. We
then summarize evidence that adrenergic arousal enhances the
effects of prioritization. The central body of the paper reviews
evidence that AA is regulated by Ih-currents which are them-
selves regulated by the adrenergic system, thus providing a
means by which arousal can enhance AA. These processes are
then related to disturbances of context-sensitivity and states of
consciousness in schizophrenia that may be due to mutations
in the DISC1 gene that lead to excessive Ih, and thus reduced
AA. Implications of these findings for theories of adrenergic
arousal, neocortical computation, and consciousness are then
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discussed. Finally, we note reservations that must be placed on
the inference that arousal regulates AA via Ih-currents, and list
a few of the many questions that arise.
Suprathreshold Depolarization of the Apical
Integration Zone Amplifies Response to Basal
and Perisomatic Inputs
Amplification of some signals and suppression of others is a
crucial function of the neocortex, but how do local cortical cir-
cuits know what to amplify and what to suppress? As noted
above, it has often been suggested that one of the functions of
arousal and attention is to increase the “signal” to “noise” ratio,
but distinguishing between “signal” and “noise” is far from
easy. Information that is highly relevant in some brain regions
or in some contexts may be irrelevant or even detrimental in
other regions or other contexts. Neurobiological and psychologi-
cal evidence from a wide range of mammals from rodents to hu-
mans shows that the selectivity required to distinguish
between the signals to be enhanced and those to be suppressed
is highly dynamic and depends upon current tasks, thoughts,
and emotions as well as upon current exteroceptive and intero-
ceptive inputs. Dynamic context-sensitive processes are there-
fore required to distinguish between “signal” and “noise.”
Apical amplification provides an intracellular mechanism serv-
ing that requirement.
The particular signals to be amplified or suppressed must be
specified by intracortical interactions because they require
highly informative and locally specific interactions. We there-
fore review recent evidence for intracellular and microcircuit
mechanisms by which signals are either amplified or sup-
pressed within neocortex, prior to their further modulation by
the noradrenergic system. Direct evidence for AA is provided by
patch-clamping studies showing that inputs to the apical tufts
of pyramidal cells are integrated separately from inputs to their
basal dendrites before being used to modulate the cell’s re-
sponse. Current models of neocortex, including models of nor-
adrenergic effects such as that of Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005),
typically assume that pyramidal cells can be adequately
thought of as point processors that simply sum all of their excit-
atory and inhibitory inputs and then use that single integrated
value to determine action potential output. In contrast to that
assumption the evidence for AA clearly shows that some pyra-
midal cells have not one but two main sites of integration such
that, when apical depolarization coincides with suprathreshold
basal input, calcium spikes initiated by a site of integration near
the top of the apical dendrite amplifies the cell’s response to its
basal and perisomatic inputs (Larkum et al., 1999; Larkum et al.,
2004; Larkum et al., 2007; Larkum et al., 2009; Ledergerber and
Larkum, 2010; Larkum, 2013). The most studied mechanism by
which AA is implemented in layer 5 cells is referred to as back-
propagation activated calcium spike firing (BAC firing). Local in-
tegration within the basal and tuft dendrites depends upon the
regenerative activation of NMDA receptors (NMDA-spikes). AA
may be fully implemented by NMDA-spikes alone in supragra-
nular neurons (Palmer et al., 2014), but even in infragranular
neurons, NMDA-spikes have an important influence (Larkum
et al., 2009). Essential properties of these mechanisms are illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Though much of the evidence reviewed con-
cerns pyramidal cells in layer 5, broadly similar conclusions
also apply to supragranular neurons (Lucy Palmer, personal
communication). Inhibitory interneurons that specifically target
apical dendrites in layer 1, such as Martinotti cells, produce dis-
amplification. They suppress amplification without inhibiting
action-potential output.
Evidence reviewed in detail by Phillips (2015) provides four
distinct neurobiological grounds for asserting that excitatory
apical input amplifies the cell’s response to its basal input. First,
the findings of multisite intracellular patch-clamping studies
directly show that apical input can lead to dendritic spikes that
are initiated locally in the apical tuft dendrites. Second, the elec-
tronic distance of tuft input from the somatic zone of AP gener-
ation puts that input in a special position that differs from
that of basal/perisomatic input. This difference increases with
increases in the length of the apical dendrite. Third, the apical
integration zone receives input from sources differing greatly
from that of basal input. Tuft synapses in layer 1 receive
Figure 1. Distribution of Ih and NE varicosities. (A) Left, Photomicrograph adapted from Audet et al. (1988) showing the distribution of noradrenergic
varicosities (black dots) found throughout the neocortex. Right, immunocytochemical labeling of HCN (Ih) channels in the neocortex from Lo¨rincz
et al. (2001). (B) Schematic diagram of integration zones in L5 neocortical pyramidal neurons showing the areas of the dendrite that evoke Ca2þand
NMDA spikes (Larkum et al., 2009). The graded shading and arrows denote the density of Ih-channels (gray) and NE receptors (NA) (yellow in the
online version) embedded in the dendritic membrane of L5 neurons. (C) Schematic diagram of the distribution of NE varicosities found throughout
the neocortex (black dots) relative to the distribution of Ih in pyramidal neurons (shown by shading of the dendrites).
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long-range inputs that convey contextual information from di-
verse feedback, lateral, thalamic, and subcortical sources,
whereas the basal and perisomatic inputs receive feed-forward
synaptic inputs that specify the cell’s receptive-field selectivity.
Fourth, computational studies show that neurons with func-
tionally distinct apical and somatic zones of integration can
provide the context-sensitivity shown by a wide variety of per-
ceptual and cognitive functions. In addition to these four
grounds high-resolution layer-specific fMRI has now shown
that, in scene perception by humans, the most superficial layers
are sensitive to contextual information from the surround but
deeper layers are not (Muckli et al., 2015), providing further evi-
dence that context-sensitive modulation is mediated by inputs
to the tufts of pyramidal cells.
Overall, these findings suggest that apical amplification, to-
gether with the disamplifying effects of inhibitory interneurons
that specifically target the tuft, provides neurocomputational
primitives that can be clearly distinguished from the well-
known primitives of excitation, inhibition, and disinhibition as
shown by the simple abstractions in Fig. 2. This figure distin-
guishes six kinds of interaction between pyramidal cells.
Amplification must be distinguished from somatic excitation
because, in the absence of basal/perisomatic depolarization,
depolarizing input to the tuft can be strong while having little or
no effect on AP generation. Disamplification must be distin-
guished from basal/perisomatic inhibition because it can be
strong without inhibiting AP output. Dis-disamplification must
be distinguished from disinhibition because its effects are de-
pendent upon the presence of excitatory input to the apical in-
tegration zone. These primitives can be combined into various
circuits and local microcircuits. They provide motifs that recur
throughout neocortex independently of whether or not they do
so via a single canonical microcircuit. Whatever the nature of
those microcircuits the evidence we review shows that AA is de-
pendent on the current state of arousal. Changes in that state
are so dynamic and context-sensitive that they underlie much
of the trial-to-trial variability observed in neuronal response to
sensory input (McGinley et al., 2015; Safaai et al., 2015). Relevant
research on adrenergic arousal is therefore summarized in the
following section before relating it to AA and Ih-currents.
Adrenergic Arousal Enhances the Effects
of Prioritization
The effects of adrenergic arousal and its interaction with priori-
tization are many and varied [see Mather et al. (2015) for an in-
depth review and expert commentary]. Aston-Jones (1985) pro-
posed that a major function of adrenergic arousal is to improve
the signal to noise ratio, and much evidence supports this. More
recently, behavioral evidence from cognitive neuroscience, to-
gether with in vitro evidence revealing glutamatergic NMDA-
receptor mediated modulation of NE release from cortical vari-
cosities, has further strengthened the proposal that competing
cortical representations are regulated by an interaction between
glutamate and NE (GANE) (Mather et al., 2015). This proposed
mechanism depends on postsynaptic receptors that have an es-
sential role in spike-timing-dependent cortical plasticity (Huang
et al., 2012) with one subtype being linked to long-term potentia-
tion (LTP) and another to long-term depression (LTD). NE con-
centrations that mediate LTP effects are an order of magnitude
higher than those that mediate LTD effects (Salgado et al., 2012).
Thus, NE “hot spots” at synapses with high levels of glutamate
release recruit postsynaptic receptor actions supporting
short- and long-term strengthening of the most active circuits.
Lateral inhibition and the effects of LTD on less active circuits
additionally contribute to the winner-take-all and loser-take-
less dynamics. The recruitment by priority of LC-NE hotspots
through GANE explains a wide range of arousal-associated ef-
fects in cognition (Mather et al., 2015). This perspective implies
that cortico-cortical interactions prioritize selected signals prior
to their further enhancement by LC-NE input. As reviewed in
detail below, AA could provide the locally specific intracortical
prioritization on which such theories of arousal depend.
Ih-Currents Regulate AA
As depicted in Fig. 1, many studies show that the density of
Ih-channels is high in the apical tree of pyramidal neurons (e.g.
Williams and Stuart, 2000; Berger et al., 2001; Larkum et al., 2001;
Lo¨rincz et al., 2002, Kole et al., 2006), but low in other compart-
ments (e.g. Acker and Antic, 2009; Nevian et al., 2007). This den-
sity increases greatly with distance from the soma along the
apical trunk and plateaus at a uniformly high level within the
tuft (Harnett et al., 2015). The Ih-channels that have the fast bio-
physical properties best suited to rapid computations are the
hyperpolarization-activated cyclic nucleotide-gated cation
(HCN) channels with HCN1 subunits, and it is Ih-channels with
those subunits that are common in the apical tree of pyramidal
neurons (Berger et al., 2001, 2003). Put simply, Ih-channels re-
duce the coupling between apical and somatic integration zones
by providing a short-circuit that reduces current flow along the
Figure 2. Primitive interactions from which neocortical circuits are
built. The generic form of pyramidal cells is shown in a way that dis-
tinguishes their apical and basal trees. No attempt is made to show
any columnar organization. The two cells shown in each of the six
sections could be in either the same or different columns, or even in
different cortical regions. They are shown at different heights in the
diagram simply for diagrammatic convenience. Hyperpolarization-
activated currents are shown as Ih. Inhibitory interneurons are
shown as ovals. Cholinergic inputs are shown as ACh. Adrenergic in-
puts are shown as NE. Inputs from both of these subcortical modula-
tory systems tend to increase activation, and presumably in
complementary ways. The outputs of individual neurons could com-
bine these primitives in various ways. For example, the outputs of a
given pyramidal cell could be excitatory at some of its projective
sites and amplifying at others, or an inhibitory interneuron could
combine disinhibition with dis-disamplification by inhibiting inter-
neurons that target the soma as well as those that target the tuft.
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dendrite by increasing current flow across the dendritic
membrane.
Dense Ih-currents increase the electrotonic distance between
adjacent dendritic compartments, so they tend to normalize in-
tegration within the tuft (Magee, 1999) and reduce subthreshold
communication between apical and somatic integration zones
(Berger et al., 2001). This applies only at subthreshold levels of
postsynaptic potential, however, because the activation curve
for these channels is such that they inactivate with depolariza-
tion. This has the consequence that subthreshold events are
processed almost exclusively in their respective compartments
(apical or basal) until threshold is reached for a local spike that
can then influence the other compartment. Another crucial
consequence of tonic leak conductance in the tuft is that the
resting membrane potential is shifted 10–20 mV unevenly as a
function of location such that the tuft dendrite is tonically more
depolarized than the cell body under control conditions. On the
other hand, the local input resistance is constant over much of
the dendritic membrane well into the tuft dendrite (Zhu, 2000).
The average effect of blocking Ih-channels on tuft resting mem-
brane potential is to hyperpolarize by 17 mV, whereas the same
manipulation causes a shift of only 11 mV at the soma (Berger
et al., 2001) rendering the resulting membrane potential every-
where in the cell the same without Ih-current. The corollary is
that, counterintuitively, blocking Ih actually decreases excitabil-
ity at proximal locations because the proximal resting potential
is more hyperpolarized without the compensatory influence of
local dendritic regenerative currents that occur in the tuft den-
drite (Harnett et al., 2015). Blocking Ih activity also increases
temporal integration within tuft dendrites and enhances the ef-
fects of apical depolarization on AP generation (Berger et al.,
2001, 2003; Larkum et al., 2009; Harnett et al., 2015). In summary,
the high density of Ih in the tuft enhances the contribution of lo-
cal spikes (Ca2þand NMDA) to the firing of the neuron and redu-
ces the influence of subthreshold synaptic input over large
distances. In other words, Ih provides an efficient biophysical
mechanism by which pyramidal cells can function as a two-
compartment neuron with two sites of integration and with a
dedicated, threshold-dependent, form of communication be-
tween them.
The high density of Ih-channels in the distal apical trunks
and tufts is not present at early stages of neocortical develop-
ment. In rats, their density in the distal apical trunk and tuft in-
creases 10-fold during the early stages of development
(Atkinson and Williams, 2009). Combined with the emergence
of robust Ca2þspikes in the tuft region (Zhu, 2000), this means
that in young animals (<post-natal day10 in rodents) pyramidal
neurons act as compact single-site integrators, and develop into
integrators with distinct sites for somatic integration and apical
modulation as the neocortex grows in size and the density of
synapses in the tuft increases. In the distal apical dendrites of
mature layer 5B neurons there is also a high density of KV chan-
nels, suggesting that Ih and KV conductances could interact to
control the initiation of dendritic spikes (Harnett et al., 2013,
2015). Blocking KV channels enhances the effect of tuft input on
AP generation, but has no effect on AP generation by basal in-
puts alone (Harnett et al., 2013).
Given that Ih occurs throughout neocortex we need to under-
stand its functions, and several possibilities have been sug-
gested. There is evidence that in region CA1 of the
hippocampus Ih-currents can normalize temporal summation
so that it becomes independent of apical distance (Magee, 1999).
We know of no evidence that AA occurs in three-layer struc-
tures such as hippocampus and olfactory cortex, however, so
our working hypotheses is that the far greater evolutionary ex-
pansion of six-layer neocortex rather than of the more ancient
three-layer cortex is in part due to the enhanced capabilities
consequent upon the emergence of AA in neocortex. There is a
little evidence that normalization by Ih may also occur in the
neocortex (Williams and Stuart, 2000; Berger et al., 2001), but
other functions for Ih are more likely there. First, they may en-
hance the temporal precision of coincidence detection by short-
ening the duration of temporal integration (Berger and Lu¨scher,
2003). Second, there is evidence that they constrain synaptic
plasticity at distal apical dendrites (Nolan et al., 2004). Third,
they may linearize integration within the tuft because of their
uniformly high density there (Berger et al., 2001; Harnett et al.,
2015). Fourth, they enhance suprathreshold interactions be-
tween apical and somatic zones (Berger et al., 2001, 2003), while
suppressing subthreshold interactions so that basal inputs do
not trigger apical calcium spikes in the absence of tuft depolari-
zation (Berger et al., 2003). Fifth, regulation of both tonic and
phasic states of arousal by NE may involve its suppressive ef-
fects on Ih-currents (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009).
Each of the five possible functions for Ih-currents listed
above is likely to be of importance at some stage of develop-
ment in some regions of some species. There is plenty of room
for further studies of each of these possible functions, but it is
clear now that in mature neocortex Ih-currents isolate the
subthreshold integration of synaptic inputs to their respective
subcellular compartments and regulate the generation of local
spikes that communicate between apical and somatic compart-
ments. This all suggests that the contribution of the apical zone
to the generation of action potentials depends upon the regula-
tion of Ih-currents.
Regulation of Ih-currents is not a simple matter of having
them fully open or fully closed, however. Both extremes are
likely to be malfunctional. If the Ih-currents are too strong then
there will be little or no communication between the apical and
somatic zones. This could lead to incoherent and unregulated
responses to sensory input, and thus to high levels of distracti-
bility and uncontrolled impulsive responses. In cases where
driving input is internally generated this could lead to thoughts
that combine incoherent elements and which are inadequately
related to the evolving train of thought. For all these reasons we
assume that Ih-currents can be too strong.
We also assume that Ih-currents can be too weak. A severe
reduction of Ih by the inherited absence of HCN1 channels can
produce pathologically strong epileptic AP output (Kole et al.,
2007). Even when less severe, weaknesses in Ih can still be mal-
functional because AP output could then be generated by either
basal or apical input alone. Consider first the case where APs
are generated by apical depolarization alone. This is likely to
lead to incoherent unpredictable outcomes because the cell’s
output will then lose its dependence on the basal input that
specifies the cell’s selective sensitivity. Now consider the case
where APs are generated by somatic depolarization alone.
Calcium spikes from the apical integration zone could then be
triggered by back-propagating APs alone, and that would further
increase AP output whatever the tuft input. This effect could be
of adaptive advantage in producing fast strong feedforward ac-
tivity in highly arousing situations that trigger rapid “reactive”
responses. It would not be adaptive in situations where slower
more “reflective” processing is the better option, however. This
may be important in many social situations where better out-
comes are achieved by reflective than by impulsive reactions
(Strack and Deutsch, 2004). A key property of AA is that it facili-
tates a form of recurrent reflective processing in which a wide
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range of neocortical activities can influence each local processor
so as to produce coherent patterns of overall activity. This is a
process known as “relaxation” in neural-network theory (Amit,
1989). Relaxation takes time, however, and there are situations
in which rapid responses are required. In those cases, it may be
useful for AP generation by feedforward basal drive to take pre-
cedence over relaxation by iterations of AA, and this could be
achieved by reducing Ih-currents, which is exactly the effect
produced by high levels of NE during stressful situations. Ih-lev-
els must therefore be controlled so that they are both well
suited to current needs and neither too strong nor too weak.
The following section therefore reviews evidence that prefron-
tal and neuromodulatory systems are involved in setting those
levels.
Arousal Regulates Ih-Currents
Ascending influences from subcortical noradrenergic and cho-
linergic systems interact to regulate the firing mode of layer 5
pyramidal cells by modulating both voltage-dependent and
voltage-independent conductances (Wang and McCormick,
1993) as indicated in Fig. 2. These subcortical systems are them-
selves regulated by descending influences from neocortex.
Signals from the LC regulate the overall level of tonic back-
ground adrenergic activity and can also produce temporary
phasic increases in adrenergic activity (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2004; McGinley et al., 2015; Mather et al., 2015). NE receptors are
well placed to regulate Ih-currents because, as shown in Fig. 1,
their subcellular distributions are closely matched. Adrenergic
activity is known to play a crucial role in the working memory
functions of primate prefrontal cortex (PFC) and to do so by
modulating Ih-currents (Li and Mei, 1994; Wang et al., 2007). For
a recent review see Robbins and Arnsten (2009). These currents
weaken the effects of nearby synaptic inputs, and a2a-adrenore-
ceptors are well positioned to modulate their activity (Wang
et al., 2007). Pharmacological, electrophysiological, and genetic
knockdown studies have all been interpreted as indicating that
when activated in dorsolateral PFC these adrenoreceptors
weaken nearby Ih-currents (Li et al., 1999; Ramos et al., 2005;
Wang et al., 2007).
In some regions of some species, the effects of adrenergic ac-
tivity on Ih-currents may be mediated by modulation of Ca
þ 2-
cAMP signaling (Arnsten et al., 2012). Arnsten et al. argue that
NE suppresses Ih-currents in primate dlPFC by reducing cAMP
levels in spine necks via a2a-adrenoreceptors. This argument is
based on three grounds. First, a2a-adrenoreceptors colocalize
with Ih-currents near the synapse and in the spine neck.
Second, stimulation of a2a-adrenoreceptors, with an a2a-adre-
noreceptor agonist increases pyramidal cell response to those
inputs to which it is selectively sensitive (Wang et al., 2007).
Third, blockade of a2a-adrenoreceptors with an antagonist
causes a collapse of dlPFC network firing (Li et al., 1999) that can
be restored by blocking Ih-channels (Wang et al., 2007). A major
goal for future research will be to determine to what extent
these intracellular processes depend upon species, region, and
maturity.
Arousal Enhances AA by Reducing
Apical Ih-Currents
Given evidence that adrenergic arousal reduces Ih-currents and
that Ih-currents reduce AA we infer that adrenergic arousal en-
hances AA by reducing Ih-currents. This inference has been
directly confirmed in the case of rat PFC. There it has been
shown both that NE enhances the generation of apical calcium
spikes by back-propagating APs and that this is done by inhibit-
ing Ih-currents (Barth et al., 2008). Voltage-clamp analysis in sli-
ces of rat PFC also found that a2-NE receptor stimulation
inhibited Ih and enhanced temporal summation during trains of
distally evoked EPSPs (Carr et al., 2007). The net effect of adre-
nergic stimulation was to suppress response to isolated excit-
atory inputs while enhancing the response to a coherent burst
of synaptic activity. Further support for this view is provided by
evidence that a2a-adrenoreceptors are located on the apical
dendrites of PFC pyramidal neurons in monkeys (Aoki et al.,
1998).
Though subject to reservations noted in the final section, it
seems likely that by opposing Ih-currents both tonic and phasic
adrenergic arousal will increase the contribution of the apical
integration zone to AP-generation. Thus, interactions between
adrenergic arousal and AA may help us understand how wide-
spread changes in conscious state affect fundamental processes
of perception and cognition. Further evidence for this comes
from studies of genetic and cognitive impairments in schizo-
phrenia, as reviewed in the following section.
Genetic and Cognitive Impairments in
Schizophrenia may Involve AA
Schizophrenia has been associated with translocations of the
disrupted in schizophrenia 1 (DISC1) gene (St Clair et al., 1990;
Millar et al., 2000; Blackwood et al., 2001; Robbins and Arnsten,
2009). This gene is related to cognitive functioning and to struc-
tural PFC alterations in the general population (Chubb et al.,
2008). It is known to regulate cortical development in animals
(Hikida et al., 2007), and its abnormal expression has been re-
lated to abnormal neurodevelopment in schizophrenia (Cannon
et al., 2005). For example, two groups (Hikida et al., 2007;
Pletnikov et al., 2008) studied the effects, in mice, of human
DISC1 cDNA transgenes designed to express a truncated DISC1
protein, similar to that associated with schizophrenia. Both
studies found increased lateral ventricle size, as measured us-
ing MRI, a feature that has often been found in both people with
schizophrenia and in their unaffected first-degree relatives.
DISC1 may affect Ih, and thus AA, via its effects on cAMP sig-
naling. The protein produced by the DISC1 gene binds to and
regulates phosphodiesterase-4 isozymes (PDE4s), which nor-
mally increase hydrolysis of cAMP under conditions of high
cAMP concentration (Millar et al., 2007; Millar et al., 2005). The re-
duction in DISC1 in schizophrenia caused by the translocation
could therefore lead to excessive cAMP levels, which then leads
to excessive Ih (Wang et al., 2007). Indeed, mice with a DISC1 al-
teration that is homologous to the human DISC1 translocation
show decreased PDE4 activity and excessive cAMP levels (Millar
et al., 2005; Kvajo et al., 2011), which lead to increased Ih and re-
duced AA. Moreover, mouse models of the DISC1 translocation
in schizophrenia produces animals with cognitive impairments
that resemble those found in schizophrenia (Koike et al., 2006;
Kvajo et al., 2008).
The cognitive impairments in schizophrenia are not limited
to functions of the PFC (Paspalas et al., 2013), or hippocampus
(Kim et al., 2012; Inta et al., 2014), and include many that could
be due to a reduction in AA-dependent context-sensitivity. It
has been clearly shown that schizophrenia is characterized by a
widespread impairment in cognitive coordination, reflecting a
disturbance in the basic processes responsible for the adaptive
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use of contextual information to guide the processing and
learning of feedforward input (Phillips et al., 2015; Phillips and
Silverstein, 2003, 2013). This disturbance, which is manifested
in many perceptual, attentional, memory, linguistic, and learn-
ing changes (Phillips and Silverstein, 2003, 2013; Phillips et al.,
2015), could arise from disturbances in AA (Phillips, 2015), con-
sistent with computational arguments and network simulations
based on information theory (Phillips and Singer, 1997; Kay and
Phillips, 2011; Silverstein et al., submitted). Though much of the
past work on the role of cAMP-Ih signaling in regulating dy-
namic changes in the strength of functional connections has fo-
cused on the PFC (Arnsten, 2009; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007;
Paspalas et al., 2013), impairments of context-sensitivity in
schizophrenia also occur in many other neocortical regions
(Phillips and Silverstein, 2003; Silverstein et al., 2009). DISC1
translocation-related excessive cAMP-Ih signaling and thus re-
duced AA could account for many forms of the reduced influ-
ence of context that are observed in schizophrenia (Phillips
et al., 2015). Our previous emphasis on NMDA-receptor malfunc-
tions in schizophrenia (e.g. Phillips and Silverstein, 2003) re-
mains valid because AA depends on normal NMDA-receptor
activation (Major et al., 2013; Palmer et al., 2014). Finally, schizo-
phrenia patients with high levels of orexin A, a neuropeptide
that regulates arousal level, have lower levels of negative and
disorganized symptoms, the symptoms most associated with
cognitive impairment in this disorder (Keri et al., 2005;
Torniainen et al., 2012; Minor et al., 2015). They also have better
cognitive functioning compared to patients with low levels of
orexin A (Chien et al., 2015). This suggests that arousal, as long
as it is kept within tolerable limits (Vijayraghavan et al., 2007;
Hains and Arnsten, 2008; Hains et al., 2015), could be a cognition
enhancing mechanism for schizophrenia. This hypothesis is
consistent with much work on the positive effects of nicotine
on cognition in patients with the disorder who smoke (Harris
et al., 2004), on arousal level in nonpatient smokers (Kalman
and Smith, 2005), and on the effects of smoking on NE release
(Sterley et al., 2014).
Prima facie it might seem that psychotic delusions could be
due to excessive effects of internally generated or “top-down”
activity mediated via the tuft synapses in layer 1. If that were
the case, however, then such psychotic states would be associ-
ated with Ih-currents that are too weak. This contrasts with the
evidence on DISC1, which suggests that Ih-currents are too
strong. Strong Ih opposes the effects of tuft input on AP output,
indicating that the content of psychotic thoughts is conveyed
predominantly by the basal synapses, with little or no modula-
tion by apical input. This suggests that such thoughts are psy-
chotic, not because they have an internal origin, but because
they lack the coherence and sensitivity to current circum-
stances normally imposed by the contextual modulation that is
mediated by apical input.
Implications for the GANE Theory of
Adrenergic Arousal
The evidence for noradrenergic control of Ih-currents suggests a
major expansion of the GANE model that was proposed by
Mather et al. (2015). The high density of LC noradrenergic vari-
cosities in layers 1 and 2 of neocortex (Audet et al., 1988; Agster
et al., 2013) is consistent with a special role of apical tufts in me-
diating the prioritizing function of cortico-cortical connections
required in GANE. For example, tonic arousal associated with
LC-NE neuronal activation (Carter et al., 2010) sets up an “alert”
state for environmental monitoring (Constantinople and Bruno,
2011; Polack et al., 2013). Increased NE levels will increase the ef-
fects of tuft input by suppressing the Ih-currents that isolate the
tuft, thus enhancing the selective amplification of contextually
appropriate signals. When changing contingencies occur, pha-
sic NE release (Bouret and Sara, 2005), and GANE mechanisms
would be recruited. Under the GANE model, the glutamate am-
plification of phasic NE release occurs when varicosities are
maximally depolarized and glutamate release is sufficient to
engage NMDA receptors through spillover. For evidence that
this increases local NE concentrations to a level that engages se-
lective mechanisms for resource allocation and the promotion
of plasticity see Mather et al. (2015). AA provides a selective
mechanism with the required local specificity. It strengthens
circuits with co-incident apical and basal dendritic depolariza-
tions thus leading to flexible context-sensitive behaviors in
both the short-term and the long-term. Finally, it must also be
noted that, although the GANE theory is to a large extent sup-
ported and extended by the studies reviewed above and by the
neurocomputational theory of AA discussed next, neither the-
ory logically entails the other.
Implications for the Coherent Infomax Theory
of Neocortical Computation
These studies of arousal and Ih-currents make important contri-
butions to our understanding of the computational capabilities
of neocortical pyramidal cells. Four distinct neurobiological
grounds were given above for the view that input to the tuft of
pyramidal cells enhances their capabilities by amplifying their
response to basal/perisomatic input. Studies of Ih-channels add
to this view in three ways. First, their high density in the apical
tree but low density in the basal/perisomatic tree provides di-
rect anatomical grounds for distinguishing between apical and
basal/perisomatic input. Second, those studies provide evidence
that within the main trunk of the apical dendrite active currents
do not compensate for electrotonic distance so as to approxi-
mate a “dendritic democracy” (Branco and H€ausser, 2011). On
the contrary, they increase the functional separation between
the apical and somatic integration zones. Third, those studies
suggest that Ih-currents provide a means by which subthreshold
integration in the apical zone can be isolated from the somatic
zone while facilitating suprathreshold interactions such that
apical depolarization turns single APs into a burst of 2–4 APs
lasting about 10–20 ms (Larkum, 2013).
All these findings provide some support for theories of neo-
cortical computation that emphasize context-sensitive modula-
tion, such as those of counter-stream architectures (Ullman,
1995) and free energy reduction (Friston, 2010). They provide
particularly strong support for the theory of coherent infomax
(Kay and Phillips, 2011; Wibral et al., 2015), however, because the
capabilities that AA and its regulatory mechanisms provide are
exactly those required by that theory (Phillips, 2015). The theory
of coherent infomax has been rigorously formulated in informa-
tion theoretic terms and, in addition to correctly predicting the
activation function now confirmed by the findings related to
AA, it includes a biologically plausible learning rule derived ana-
lytically from the proposed information-processing objective
(Phillips et al., 1995; Kay, 1999; Kay and Phillips, 2011, Wibral
et al., 2015). It has been tested by large computational simula-
tions (Kay et al., 1998), and has been related in detail to a wide
range of empirical findings from several disciplines (Phillips,
2015). In short, the theory of coherent infomax hypothesizes
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that local cortical processors can amplify relevant activities and
suppress irrelevant activities because they receive both recep-
tive field inputs that specify the semantic content of their out-
puts and contextual field inputs that inform them of activity
elsewhere in the system. This enables them to search for holis-
tic Gestalt patterns of activity that maximize coherence across
the system as a whole. Though that theory was not originally
committed to the hypothesis that the capabilities that it re-
quires are implemented at a cellular level, it did explicitly pre-
dict that local processors with exactly those capabilities are
replicated many times over across the neocortex. That predic-
tion has now been confirmed in a way that clearly implicates
the intracellular processes of AA (Phillips, 2015).
The theory of coherent infomax has much in common with
that of integrated information theory (Oizumi et al., 2014), but
differs in incorporating recent advances in the formulation of
Shannon information (Wibral et al., 2015), and in emphasizing
AA as a way in which coherent infomax could be implemented
in neocortex. Coherent infomax as implemented by AA offers a
perspective on relations between arousal and cognition that ad-
vances beyond previous conceptions (e.g. Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). It builds on the evidence that neocortical pyrami-
dal cells are not simply integrate-and-fire point processors but
have two functionally distinct sites of integration, and uses that
to explain how context-sensitive modulation can be locally spe-
cific in space and time. Put simply, from the perspective of this
theory, modulation of cortical activity by subcortical systems is
seen as enhancing the modulatory interactions that occur
within the neocortical system itself.
Implications for Theories Relating Apical
Amplification to States of Consciousness
during Wakefulness, Sleep, and Anesthesia
Bachmann and Hudetz (2014) and Meyer (2015) review evidence
relating states of consciousness to the amplifying effects of in-
put to the apical tufts of pyramidal cells in neocortex. The con-
clusion inferred from this evidence by Bachmann and Hudetz
(2014) is that basal inputs specify the contents of consciousness
and apical inputs determine the level of consciousness. They ar-
gue that basal input alone generates short-lived EPSPs and frag-
mented cortical neural activity but not a sustained “field of
consciousness.” If there is also sufficient modulatory input to
the apical dendrites of the cells conveying the cognitive content,
however, then this amplifies their neuronal output, thus pro-
ducing the integrative computation experienced as the normal,
context-sensitive, state of wakeful consciousness. Bachmann
and Hudetz (2014) present several arguments in support of their
theory, and draw on empirical evidence from various disci-
plines, including psychophysical studies of the time-course of
visual masking, and studies of the effects of anesthetics on den-
dritic calcium spikes and on the N1 event-related potential that
is associated with awareness. Meyer (2015) reviews evidence
concerning the cellular mechanisms involved in the effects of a
wide variety of general anesthetic agents. He concludes that
most of them operate by interfering with the modulatory effects
of apical input. This includes a link to Ih-currents because a sub-
set of general anesthetics that includes isoflorane, halothane,
propofol, and ketamine has been shown to produce tonic sup-
pression of Ih-currents (Meyer 2015; Zhou 2012). Meyer (2015) ar-
gues that when Ih is fully blocked, somatic activation alone may
trigger a dendritic calcium spike, leading to a breakdown of the
mechanism by which only contextually prioritized signals are
raised above the level of general background activity.
Studies of apical activity in awake rodents provide evidence
that AA might be involved in cognitive behavior (Murayama
et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2012; Cichon and Gan, 2015; Manita et al.,
2015). In studies of human perception, overt detection of near-
threshold stimuli has often been interpreted as an indicator of
perceptual awareness, with processing below the level of detec-
tion being described as subliminal. Testing whether perceptual
awareness of near-threshold stimuli depends upon AA is there-
fore a critical step toward establishing the importance of AA for
conscious perception. The AA hypothesis predicts that (i) apical
activity should be positively correlated with perceptual detec-
tion; and (ii) suppressing it should impair detection. These pre-
dictions have recently been tested in rodents using two-photon
imaging of apical Ca2þactivity in layer 5 pyramidal neurons,
and preliminary data suggest that these predictions are indeed
correct (Takahashi and Larkum, 2016).
The altered state of consciousness experienced as dreaming
may show what happens when activity that is initiated inter-
nally is transmitted through the cortical system via basal and
perisomatic synapses in the absence of the contextual modula-
tion that would help make it relevant and coherent when
awake. We infer that unmodulated transmission of cognitive
content occurs during dreams because, although cholinergic ac-
tivity increases greatly during REM sleep, NE activity is switched
off, thus maximizing Ih and isolating apical input from the so-
matic zone that generates action potentials. This reminds us
that the feedforward drive transmitted via basal synapses can-
not in general be identified with activity of external origin. It
may also help explain why dreams, and other examples of what
Freud called primary process thinking, seem to share the prop-
erty of bizarre incoherence with psychosis, as noted long ago
(Jung, 1907). Experimental studies (Scarone et al., 2008) provide
quantitative evidence of this similarity between dreaming and
psychotic states, and it can be interpreted as indicating that AA-
dependent contextual modulation is minimal or absent in
dreaming and weakened in psychosis.
Grounds for caution when relating consciousness to AA
have been noted in a previous paper (Phillips, 2015) and re-
sponded to Bachmann (2015), but those discussions did not con-
sider the evidence on arousal, Ih, and AA reviewed above.
Overall, this evidence supports and extends theories relating
AA to conscious state because it shows that AA depends upon
levels of adrenergic arousal that vary from being off or low dur-
ing REM and slow wave sleep, moderate during waking with
high phasic activity to relevant stimuli, and with excessive tonic
activity when stress is too high (Foote et al., 1983; Rajkowski
et al., 2004; Mather et al., 2015). This suggests that AA is at a min-
imum during dreaming and that waking conscious states de-
pend upon both tonic and phasic levels of AA.
Relating consciousness to AA may shed light on functions of
consciousness because all of the cognitive functions that have
been explicitly related to AA (as reviewed by Phillips, 2015) are
either likely to require some form of consciousness (e.g. selec-
tive attention, WM, and cognitive control) or are enhanced
when conscious (such as learning, Gestalt organization, and
contextual disambiguation). Our learning abilities, for example,
are greater when we are conscious than when we are not. There
are strong grounds for relating learning in neocortex to AA be-
cause that produces large calcium currents, which play a lead-
ing role in synaptic plasticity (Sjo¨stro¨m et al., 2008; Chichon and
Gan, 2015). Therefore, the speed with which dreams are usually
forgotten could be due to the exceptionally low levels of
8 | Phillips et al.
 by guest on O
ctober 26, 2016
http://nc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
adrenergic activity, and thus of AA, during dreaming. Gestalt or-
ganization is also enhanced when conscious. Though some
forms of Gestalt grouping occur pre-attentively, others require
attention (Phillips et al., 2010), and thus some form of conscious-
ness. Much evidence suggests that states of focused attention
when awake can be seen as states in which the tonic changes in
adrenergic arousal that occur on waking are briefly enhanced so
that they become more locally specific in space and time (Harris
and Thiel, 2011; McGinley et al., 2015). Given these consider-
ations, our working hypothesis is that apical amplification, dis-
amplification, and dis-disamplification enable or enhance
cognitive capabilities such as those listed above, and that, via
the adrenergic system, they are turned on when we awake and
depend upon arousal level when awake.
Grounds for caution when relating consciousness to AA still
remain, however, and we do not identify AA with consciousness
in general. First, AA and its regulation by adrenergic arousal are
concerned with variations in conscious state, and it has been ar-
gued that an adequate understanding of consciousness requires
state-based approaches to be combined with those concerned
with content (Hohwy, 2009). The evidence and arguments pre-
sented here strengthen the distinction between state and con-
tent, but they are not primarily concerned with mechanisms by
which the various contents of consciousness are differentiated
from each other. Second, Ih is maximal during REM sleep be-
cause adrenergic activity ceases. This minimizes AA but does
not prevent dreaming. Dreams clearly have semantic content so
any phenomenal consciousness associated with them does not
require levels of AA associated with waking. Furthermore, al-
though dream states can be characterized as flow of activity
that is low on coherence because it is unconstrained by AA, that
does not explain why those states occur. Third, the evidence re-
viewed strongly suggests that the capability for AA within pyra-
midal cells arises late in the course of both phylogenetic and
ontogenetic development. We know of no evidence that it oc-
curs in hippocampus, olfactory cortex, or subcortical regions.
So, unless we deny any form of consciousness to infants or to
species lacking a neocortex, we must distinguish between dif-
ferent forms of consciousness across individuals and species as
well as to variations over time within individuals. Fourth, the
evidence indicates that AA has less effect on fast reactive feed-
forward processing than on slow reflective processing.
Although states dominated by reactive processing differ from
those dominated by reflective processing we do not consider
them to be unconscious. Finally, although AA may be an espe-
cially effective way of maximizing coherent or integrated infor-
mation it is not the only way, so other ways may also be
associated with some form of consciousness. In response to
these reservations it could be argued that (i) consciousness is
not all or none but occurs in various states; (ii) dreams are a dis-
tinct state of consciousness; (iii) waking conscious states of ma-
ture neocortex depend upon AA; (iv) awake states vary in the
selectivity of attention and in the degree to which they are reac-
tive or reflective. Prima facie, such arguments do not seem im-
plausible, but their validity remains to be determined.
Reservations and Issues Arising
Four major reservations must be placed on the inference that
regulation of Ih-currents provides a route by which arousal can
enhance AA. First, it is only in a few regions of a few species
and at late stages of ontogenetic development that AA and
arousal-dependent regulation of Ih-currents have been shown
to occur. Uncertainties concerning the extent of their adaptive
radiation and evolutionary improvement demarcate a largely
unknown territory that remains to be explored. We assume that
there is no single optimal solution to the problem of distin-
guishing between relevant and irrelevant signals, so there is
plenty of room for evolutionary advances to improve on the
strategies for doing so. There are good grounds for assuming
that there is substantial heterogeneity across regions and spe-
cies in these intracellular processes (Arnsten et al., 2012), but we
are only at the early stages of mapping that heterogeneity. It
may well be that advanced forms of AA will be found in primate
and human PFC, but whether that is so or not remains to be
seen. Second, though it has been directly demonstrated that NE
can regulate AA by inhibiting Ih-currents (Carr et al., 2007; Barth
et al., 2008), such demonstrations are rare and far more are re-
quired. Furthermore, explanations of the effects of NE on neuro-
nal activity in PFC have been proposed that make no use of
apical inputs (e.g. Arnsten, 2012). Thus, by themselves, those
particular effects in PFC do not provide conclusive evidence on
either AA or its regulation. If the enhancement of AA by NE ob-
served by Barth et al. (2008) and Carr et al. (2007) is rare, or con-
fined only to a few regions, then that would provide a strong
constraint on the inferences that we have drawn. In contrast to
that possibility, however, those findings suggest that, if ade-
quate levels of NE are ensured, then effects of AA could be ob-
served in cases where they have so far seemed weak or absent,
as at early stages of ontogenetic development, for example.
Third, even where it has been directly demonstrated that
arousal enhances AA by reducing Ih-currents that does not
demonstrate that no other routes for such enhancement exist,
nor does it demonstrate that no routes exist by which arousal
can impair performance by suppressing AA. It has often been
shown that, although intermediate levels of arousal can en-
hance performance, even higher levels that activate low-
affinity adrenoreceptors can be detrimental to several cognitive
functions (e.g. Robbins and Arnsten, 2009; Mather et al., 2015). It
seems likely that this will also apply to AA, but the extent to
which it does so remains to be determined. Fourth, new infor-
mation theory measures have been developed by which the
contributions to output of two functionally distinct sources of
input can be assessed quantitatively (Wibral et al., 2015). Those
measures can definitively distinguish modulatory from driving
effects so they could be applied to multisite patch-clamp data
that distinguishes basal input, tuft input, and AP output. This
has not yet been done, however. When it is it will provide a di-
rect formal test of the inference that apical input is modulatory
with its effects being enhanced by NE.
Contextual guidance of learning and processing by modula-
tory interactions that do not corrupt signal semantics is central
to the theory of coherent infomax, but such a capability is also
incorporated, either explicitly or implicitly, in several other neu-
rocomputational theories (e.g. Ullman, 1995). A major goal for
future research will therefore be to relate the evidence on AA
and arousal to those theories. As an early step toward that long-
term goal we note that the well-known theory of free energy re-
duction, predictive coding, and the Bayesian brain (Friston,
2010), has been expanded to include an account of the experi-
ence of conscious presence and self-hood (Seth et al., 2011; Seth,
2013). This theory has not yet been explicitly related to the evi-
dence for AA and its regulation by arousal, though it has much
in common with the theory of coherent infomax, including a
prominent role for modulatory feedback and lateral connections
(Phillips, 2015, Section 4.3; Phillips et al., 2015, Section 6). Put
simply, predictive coding theories emphasize reducing predic-
tion error, whereas coherent infomax emphasizes increasing
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prediction success, thus implying both similarities and differ-
ences between the two theories. Prima facie, the evidence for
AA and its regulation by arousal provides stronger support for
coherent infomax because that theory emphasizes amplifica-
tion of feedforward inferences that either match the predictions
or contradict confident predictions, whereas the standard forms
of predictive coding use feedback to convert the feedforward
signal semantics into prediction errors. Furthermore, several
computational studies have shown that the contextual guid-
ance of learning and processing as formalized within the theory
of coherent infomax can be directly implemented by pyramidal
cells with two sites of integration, as reviewed in detail by
Phillips (2015). This has not yet been done for predictive coding
theories. Whether and how the strengths of the two theories
can be combined in a way that builds on the evidence for AA
and its regulation by adrenergic arousal remains to be seen.
There are many other important and unresolved issues.
Here we list only a few, citing some relevant papers. What is the
functional significance of the lower density of Ih-channels on
layer 2/3 pyramidal neurons (Larkum et al., 2007)? Does it sug-
gest that adrenergic arousal predominantly affects output from
the neocortex to subcortical systems (Sheets et al., 2011), or does
it arise more from biophysical than from functional differences
between supragranular and infragranular cells? In what ways
are the functions of Ih-channels in CA1 of the hippocampus
similar to those in the neocortex, and in what ways are they dif-
ferent (Fan et al., 2005; Tsay et al., 2007; Shah et al., 2010;
Paspalas et al., 2013; Harnett et al., 2015). Does AA make a major
contribution to the evolutionary success of neocortex? How do
cholinergic and dopaminergic modulation relate to adrenergic
modulation via Ih-channels (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009;
Arnsten et al., 2012)? Some classes of inhibitory-interneuron
have evolved to produce disamplification by specifically sup-
pressing AA (Phillips, 2015), so how do their effects interact with
Ih-currents and with the dis-disamplifying effects of acetylcho-
line (Brombas et al., 2014)? There are strong grounds for suppos-
ing that Ih-currents and AA play a crucial role in LTP, LTD, and
learning, so what exactly is that role (Brager and Johnston, 2007;
Sjo¨stro¨m et al., 2008; Shah et al., 2010)? Our discussions of poten-
tial clinical relevance have focused predominantly on schizo-
phrenia, but AA and its regulation by arousal is likely to play a
role in several other clinical conditions (Palmer, 2014; Granato,
personal communication), so how important is that role, and do
the hypotheses assessed above open new possibilities for treat-
ing those conditions?
In summary, the evidence reviewed indicates that in some
common classes of pyramidal cell arousal regulates apical am-
plification by controlling Ih-currents. This casts light on funda-
mental aspects of cognition, consciousness, and
psychopathology, and raises many issues worthy of deeper
study. If it is indeed the case that new computational primitives
of amplification, disamplification, and dis-disamplification
have evolved in neocortex then they will be relevant to a wide
variety of cognitive functions. Studies relating AA to arousal are
of particular relevance to conceptions of conscious state be-
cause they indicate that, via the adrenergic system, those primi-
tives are turned on when we awake, and are turned up when
attention is focused.
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